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CORRUPTION IN DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: KEY THREATS AND MECHANISMS TO OVERCOME THEM TO ENSURE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF UKRAINE

The article represents an attempt to comprehend and deeply analyze the exclusively complex and quite latent phenomenon of corruption in defense procurement. The current situation in Ukraine is presented, where frequent scandals related to these procurements reduce motivation of citizens to enter the Armed Forces, and the experience of NATO in this field is investigated in the retrospect. Various studies and experts opinions are taken into account during analysis. The findings allowed suggesting to use some valuable experience, such as developing, publishing, and implementation of specific Compendium similar to the one published by Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) back in 2010 and containing four parts: national and international experiences in building democratic and effective defense institutions and countering corruption in defense; chapters that look in detail at the sources of and reasons for corruption in defense; details on the relevant regulatory frameworks and proven practical approaches to integrity building at the level of the individual, the executive branch of government (and the defense ministry in particular), parliaments and audit offices, ombudsman institutions, the defense industry, civil society and the media, and international organizations; the practicalities of designing and implementing integrity-building programs in the defense sector. Network maps of procurement markets are an effective tool to highlight hotspots of corruption risk, especially in the overall high risk context of defense contracting are also suggested for use in Ukrainian system of defense procurement. In conclusion, it is claimed that systematic efforts to develop integrity, increase transparency, and improve accountability of the defense sector can minimize corruption risks and maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces and their standing in their society, even though there is rarely a nation or a defense organization that is completely free from corrupt acts.

Keywords: defense procurement; corruption; military; risk; network; NATO.

Introduction

Military procurement is essential to national security. It is not without controversy, though. They are present in every democratic society. They typically result from the interaction of cross-cutting interests within the legislative and executive arms of government, as well as the military sector, creating incentives that are not properly matched. Beyond those, each nation faces unique challenges shaped by its unique political and historical backgrounds. For example, combating corruption in defense procurement may seem very challenging if it has deeply ingrained itself into the nation's overall landscape. Corruption in this area poses a serious threat to national security, particularly during times of war.

The military is regarded as one of the top three institutions worldwide and is nearly as trustworthy in terms of corruption as non-governmental organizations and religious organizations, according to the Transparency International/Gallup "Global Corruption Barometer" study from 2006 [11]. The military is seen as less corrupt than political parties, legislatures, corporations, and the media in many different countries. However, opinions of the military's high degree of integrity vary greatly throughout nations and are-

as. For instance, the military is often seen as being free of corruption in Western Europe and the US. The military, however, does not perform as well in Africa and Latin America, nor in the recently independent governments of Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine is, unfortunately, a bright example. The facts of corruption in military in Ukraine are all the more so shocking if to take in account that the country is in the state of full-scale war.

Today, corruption in the Ukrainian army is no longer a deformation of social development, but almost the norm for a military organization. Information about corruption in the military sphere is reflected in numerous criminal cases. In January of this year, the former Deputy Minister of Defense and head of the Department of Public Procurement and Supply of Material Resources of the Ministry of Defense was informed of suspicion of embezzlement of almost a billion hryvnia. The suspicion was also reported to the former head of the department for the development of clothing support of the Central Directorate for the Development and Support of Material Support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They were charged with embezzlement of property and obstruction of the legitimate activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations.

According to the investigation, during the period of

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Цитування за ДСТУ: Мік Т. Б. Корупція в оборонних закупівлях: ключові загрози та механізми їх подолання для забезпечення національної безпеки України. *Ефективність державного управління* : зб. наук. пр. Вип. 1/2(78/79). Львів: НЛТУ України, 2024. С. 71–76.

Citation APA: Mik T. B. (2024). Corruption in defense procurement: key threats and mechanisms to overcome them to ensure the national security of Ukraine. *Efficiency of public administration*, 1/2(78/79), 71–76. <https://doi.org/10.36930/507811>

martial law, the suspects purchased 50 thousand body armor for the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which, due to their quality and characteristics, did not meet the established requirements and could not be used in the army. The goods were purchased from a non-resident company, the ultimate beneficial owners of which are citizens of Russia, that is, of the aggressor country. "According to the conclusions of forensic ballistic, commodity, and economic examinations, as a result of the supply of personal protective equipment of inadequate quality, the state suffered 948 million hryvnia in losses", the law enforcement agency said in a statement.

A previous corruption scandal in 2023 related to army supplies led to a number of senior Ukrainian officials being removed from their posts. This happened after revelations in the press that the contract signed by the ministry for the purchase of food for soldiers was inflated.

In December 2023, a high-ranking employee of the Ministry of Defense was detained in Kyiv, who was trying to steal 1.5 billion hryvnia allocated for the purchase of ammunition for the Ukrainian army. According to the investigation, in December 2022, the suspect signed an agreement with a special exporting company for the purchase of a wholesale batch of artillery shells. Subsequently, under this contract, more than 1.5 billion hryvnia were "unreasonably" transferred to a foreign account [6].

However, any attempts to publicly speak about the illegal actions of officials immediately face obstacles. Defense procurement is often considered a "state secret" and all information about it is kept secret. This tradition comes from Soviet times, but has recently proven its "convenience" for corrupt officials.

The main elements of these corruption 'constructions' are:

- Overestimation of the cost of state defense orders (overestimation of overhead costs, overestimation of the wage fund, doubling of costs in the estimate, etc.);
- Withdrawal of amounts through shell companies;
- Implementation of the principle of "one contract – one invoice" leads to a sharp increase in administrative costs and excludes the possibility of legal participation in its implementation by a significant part of small businesses.

It is also important to note that the main result of all these actions is the poor quality of services, major repairs and construction, the supply of goods, services, and most importantly weapons and military equipment, which ultimately affects the general state of military security and defense capability of the state [1].

In this context, it seems appropriate to consider general conceptual provisions regarding the phenomenon of corruption in military procurement, as well as analyze the experience of various countries in this area.

Research methods and information base. The methodology for studying corruption in defense procurement was based on the provisions of the general theory of scientific knowledge. The general scientific dialectical method and systematic approach to the study of phenomena in their interaction and interdependence were widely used. Along with this, private scientific research methods were used: formal-logical, system-structural, comparative-legal, statistical, concrete sociological.

Analysis of recent research and publications. As Todor Tagarev [17] correctly pointed out in 2010, corruption is a plague on contemporary society, and it affects the defense industry no differently than it does any other. Corrupt practices are also made easier by a number of defense-spe-

cific elements, including urgency, secrecy, and populist motivations. Unchecked corruption has an adverse effect on the military's operational efficacy, its reputation in society, the degree of respect that foreign allies accord a country's armed forces, citizen security, and, in its most extreme forms, it can jeopardize democratic governance frameworks and even the foundations of contemporary states. In order to combat the issue of corruption in military operations and defense, NATO has initiated the "building integrity" campaign. This initiative aims to promote accountability, boost transparency, and develop defense establishments' integrity through a methodical approach.

Transparency International's studies have rated the defense, along with the oil and gas extraction and construction industries, as the most corrupt sectors entrusted with managing public resources, despite the military's high regard in most societies [15]. According to the most recent data that is available, the defense industry dropped to eighth place on the "State Capture" list and thirteenth place on the list of industries where bribes to public officials are typically paid.

Therefore, it is imperative to recognize the coexistence of a generally positive perception of the military with a significant potential for corruption in the defense industry. The design and execution of anti-corruption tactics and integrity-building initiatives are impacted by this uneasy coexistence and the intricate interplay of perceptions and behavioral patterns.

The defense establishment has the power to motivate and steer broader institutional reform across a nation in governments where the military is a highly respected institution. However, it is also plausible that a strong reverence for the military could obstruct the execution of integrity-building initiatives because of the absence of openness and educated public discourse on defense. It goes without saying that combating defense corruption is essential in nations where the military is viewed as corrupt [9; 10; 16]. These are frequently the nations where corruption is rampant in both the public and private spheres. Under such circumstances, other public institutions may benefit much from the defense industry's successful transformation.

It is worth remembering that, for example, in Iraq, as a result of corruption in military recruitment and promotion, "dead souls" among soldiers, theft of weapons and supplies, the army – more powerful on paper – found itself poorly armed, understaffed and ultimately incapable to resist the rise of ISIS. International troops had to return to Iraq several years after the end of a previous training mission to stop jihadist militants [15].

Yet the link between corruption and insecurity has not become an integral part of mainstream security debates and agendas. Even when corruption is recognized as a strategic challenge, this recognition is rarely reflected in specific guidelines and tools that could protect international participation from the risk of corruption. Perhaps more importantly, such measures could help avoid situations in which international intervention unwittingly supports corrupt networks and resources are diverted.

These considerations are fundamental to military operations, from defense capacity building to stabilization, crisis management, and peacekeeping missions. Operations involve significant amounts of resources, both tangible – from local support to training and equipment – and intangible, such as support from the host nation's government and military. If those who formulate the plan and those who execute it are not careful, these resources can be diverted and misu-

sed by corrupt networks and saboteurs who take advantage of chaos and instability [11].

Prior to the NATO Summit in Warsaw, NATO's anti-corruption work was primarily through its Integrity Strengthening Program, which focused on analyzing risk factors for corruption in the defense sector and was helping to develop national anti-corruption programs. In Warsaw, with the adoption of the guidelines for strengthening the ethical framework, a significant change has occurred, as it expands the original scope of the program. The Basic Principles make clear that preventing and combating corruption must be integrated into the core missions of the Alliance, from collective defense to crisis response and cooperative security. This was soon followed by an ethics strengthening plan aimed at integrating anti-corruption aspects into NATO activities.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the basic principles and action plan. In Afghanistan, the ISAF mission only began addressing corruption issues in 2017. Nine years passed before mitigating the impact of corruption became a focus area of ISAF's operations plan [12].

Due to bypassing of corruption issues in planning and mission setting, it has become even more difficult to recognize their manifestations and consequences, in particular the impact of corruption issues on the mission's ability to achieve its objectives. This meant that the infusion of resources far in excess of Afghanistan's absorption capacity was not identified as a major risk factor. Local supply contracts, such as the host country cargo contract that fed warlords and corrupt officials, were not analyzed for possible benefits to corrupt networks. In fact, ISAF exacerbated the risk factors for corruption that they then had to combat [12].

Presentation of the main material of the study with justification of the obtained results

The justifications for corrupt defense practices – such as "secrecy", "urgency", and "concern for the people" – are listed below. Despite appearing innocent at first, the frequent use of these themes severely restricts the responsibility of those involved in the defense sector as well as the transparency of decision-making and implementation, which fosters corruption.

1. Transparency in defense has its worst enemy: secrecy. The frequent allusion to the need for secrecy to "protect national security interests" significantly curtails the possibilities for parliamentary scrutiny and other social control mechanisms aimed at reining in the executive branch. For instance, the mention of secrecy in defense procurement severely restricts the pool of possible bidders and may even result in procurement from a single provider. This not only stifles competition but, as is much too common, these kinds of schemes can be intentionally created and kept up to support corrupt activities [5].
2. A simplified method or outright breaking the law is permitted by the reference to the necessity of fulfilling operational and other defense requirements (e.g., not holding open tenders and thereby avoiding tender requirements for openness and competition). In the defense institutions of new NATO members and Partner nations that participate in international operations on a case-by-case basis or with "contingents" – i.e., units gathered for a single operational rotation – always mention urgency is made. Eager deadlines and references to confidentiality, in particular, provide a perfect environment for opaque, capricious decision-making and, consequently, corruption [15].
3. Slogans by populists also frequently allude to corruption. One instance is the insistence on "purchasing domestic de-

fense goods and services, despite the fact that there are few or no national suppliers offering these dubious goods and services that are competitive internationally. Another illustration is the "concern for the soldiers' well-being" that has resulted in opaque contracts for recreational activities, non-transparent swaps of surplus military properties for military housing, etc. The demand to behave in the "public benefit" is a third example. This includes using offset arrangements that both distort market mechanisms and encourage paybacks in a number of ways [1].

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the principal "enemies" of accountability and openness in the defense system. These are elements that also contribute to the defense sector's increased susceptibility to corruption, with far-reaching detrimental effects.

Felix Chang [3] examines issues with US, Malaysian, and Indian military acquisition. The author asserts that there are global disputes raging over military acquisition. Seldom are they ever really content. The politicians and taxpayers that finance it are frequently unhappy with the resulting cost overruns, performance deficiencies, and general waste. Professionals in government are as irritated. These include military personnel, who might not be as prepared as they could be for combat, and procurement experts, who believe that their efforts to oversee the military purchase process are consistently thwarted. Even the defense industry is irritated by the seemingly unnecessary complexity of military procurement, which prevents them from more effectively providing cutting-edge goods and services.

Corruption in the government sometimes centers on the defense industry and involves a wide range of players. Because the defense sector typically lacks the same transparency and accountability to the public and civil society as other government sectors, it is relatively simple to divert funds from this area and for covert networks to maintain the operations of dishonest officials, companies, middlemen, accountants, and attorneys – all assisted by spin doctors and false media – in the shadow of the government. In instances of "grand" corruption, shadowy enterprises and oligarchic groups criminalize the nation's politics and economy as a whole and replace public policy with their own private interests – a phenomenon described as "state capture" in the specialized literature [13]. According to this line of reasoning, combating corruption entails more than just enacting laws or "cleansing" the government; it also entails regaining control of the nation from oligarchic circles of dishonest officials and businesses, doing away with customs related to doing illicit business, and establishing the rule of law, which must be applied consistently and openly.

When a nation's security or very survival is threatened by opponents on the inside or outside (or both), widespread corruption makes the situation more worse. Afghanistan serves as a prime example of how corruption may jeopardize a nation's stability. Retired General Stanley McChrystal frequently cited poor state institutions and corruption as a major impediment to the success of Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF. He claimed that there was a "crisis of confidence among Afghans" as a result of a lack of understanding of the dynamics of crime and corruption [13]. Similarly, "endemic corruption is one of the main obstacles to the Afghan army and police being able to take over their country's security duties", according to U.S. General Robert Cone, leader of the force that trains the Afghan army and police [15].

Rendon J. and Rendon's R. study [14] looks at a few actual cases of procurement fraud in the US Department of

Defense (DoD) and how those occurrences affected internal controls and contracting procedures inside the DoD. The writers examine real cases of procurement fraud and pinpoint the stage of the contract management process at which the fraud transpired, as well as the internal control element linked to the fraudulent plan. The study's conclusions suggest that the majority of fraud instances happened during the phases of contract administration and source selection, and they involved the internal control components of monitoring, control actions, and control environments. In order to prevent and detect procurement fraud, the US government's internal control and contract management frameworks are used to analyze the fraud incidents. As a result, recommendations for strengthening internal controls and contracting procedures are created, some of which may be applicable to other international public procurement organizations. The results of the study indicate that in order to combat procurement fraud, a focus on competent contractual procedures and strong internal controls should be implemented.

The writers previously mentioned offer fascinating information. The Department of Defense (DoD) is the biggest contracting agency in the US federal government. From FY 2000 to FY2014, the DoD's contract liabilities grew from US\$190 billion to US\$290 billion. The DoD awarded contracts for over US\$285 billion for goods and services in FY2014. This sum exceeds the total of all other federal government agencies put together. These contracts cover mission-critical supplies and services in addition to large weapon systems. Public procurement rules and regulatory procedures control these contracts since they serve national defense and are paid by monies that have been approved by Congress. These procurement laws and rules are designed to guarantee that contracts are granted in accordance with public policy and that contractual exchanges are carried out in an honest, transparent, and accountable manner. This is not always the case, though. DoD contract administration has been deemed a high-risk area by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) because of the difficulties in managing the acquisition workforce, carrying out contracting strategies and tactics, supervising service acquisitions, and providing operational contract support. Because DoD contract management is more susceptible to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, the GAO gave it a high risk rating [8]. Furthermore, fraud within the DoD "presents a significant threat to the organization's mission and efforts to ensure warfighter safety", according to the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) [7].

Based on the principles of auditability theory, Rendon and R. Rendon [14] present the "auditability triangle" (see Fig. 1) in their additional study. A four-level auditability framework can be used to describe the organization's auditability journey. The organization's level of self-awareness and process and practice control is reflected in each level. Level 1 is centered on events and transactions and has an operational process focus. Level 2 is centered on system-based auditing and has an accounting emphasis. Level 3 is centered on operational policies and relies on audits to verify that all organizational controls are implemented. Lastly, Level 4 is centered on auditing or confirming that the manager is in charge, that is, whether the management takes action when anything goes wrong, and it represents a management process focus. Every level of the framework represents the level of self-awareness and control that the organization possesses, together with the kind of evidence that can be audited.




Fig. 1. Auditability triangle [14]

The authors suggest that all parties involved in contracting receive specialized training from the DoD about the detection of signs of procurement fraud and how it affects internal agency controls. The DoD contracting personnel should be required to complete this training as part of the core curriculum for contracts.

Although combating defense corruption is an extremely challenging task, it is necessary to restore public trust in the defense industry and to deliver security and defense at a reasonable cost and risk. Furthermore, although it is far from certain that defense corruption can be completely eradicated, there are tried-and-true methods and best practices that, when applied correctly, can be used to reduce corruption.

It is useful to follow the current strategy used by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and NATO to address the problem of defense corruption. It expands upon the work of a number of stakeholders, such as activist organizations and non-governmental research tanks. For instance, a 2008 non-governmental research found a number of crucial actions that would swiftly reduce the possibility of corruption in the Bulgarian defense institution [11]:

1. Establishing suitable legal and procedural frameworks to eradicate corruption in the military industry, with a priority on the following:
 - Development and consistent use of program-based, goal-oriented budgeting.
 - Significant improvement in the procurement process's transparency and the acceptance of a cap on the number of bids during tender procedures.
 - The military and the ministry of defense being immediately relieved of all fiscal responsibilities.
 - Property exchanges and related transactions are put on hold.
 - Sending only current units that are capable of participating in operations overseas.
2. Identifying the causes of inefficient management; developing and comparing strategies and approaches to address those problems; carrying out further research on corruption-related issues in stabilization and reconstruction operations; creating and implementing offset and related programs and projects.
3. Keeping an eye on the potential amount of corruption in the military industry, the steps taken to combat it by the executive and legislative branches, the private sector, and non-governmental groups.

In this case, it is acknowledged that defense corruption risks must be addressed and that comprehensive counter-corruption strategies and tactics must be developed; however, the implementation of integrity-building programs is

always context-specific and necessitates the setting of precise priorities as well as realism in the alignment of goals with organizational and human resources.

In order to assess the advancements achieved in creating useful tools, a conference was held in February 2009 by NATO, Transparency International, and the Naval Postgraduate School, which serves as the Partnership for Peace Training and Education Center in North America. The purpose of the Monterey, California, meeting was to share perspectives and firsthand knowledge about the application of integrity- and counter-building tactics in the context of larger defense institution building initiatives. The heads of state and government of NATO reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to combating corruption during the 60th anniversary NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in 2009. They also urged the EAPC to "further develop the Building Integrity initiative which promotes transparency and accountability in the defense sector, and to report back to us on this initiative at our next Summit".

The Compendium was released at the start of 2010 by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). It is divided into four sections with contributions from twenty-five writers representing twelve different countries. The compendium's first part provides national and worldwide experiences in establishing efficient, democratic military institutions and combating defense corruption. It lays forth the fundamentals of a calculated plan to lower the danger of corruption in the armed forces. The strategy incorporates initiatives to strengthen accountability, promote openness, and develop integrity. This combination raises the expected costs, or punishment, lowers perceived rewards, and raises the moral burden of corrupt activity. Nine chapters in Part II examine in-depth the causes and origins of corruption in the defense industry. Most of the chapters look at corrupt behavior and best practices for promoting accountability, transparency, and integrity in the main military management domains:

- Human resource policies and workforce administration.
- Financial management and budgeting for defense.
- Procurement.
- Adjustments for offsets.
- Outsourcing.
- Privatization.
- Public-private partnerships in defense sector.
- Making use of extra machinery and facilities.
- The engagement of defense personnel and resources in commercial endeavors.

Following that, Part III provides information on the applicable legal frameworks and tried-and-true methods for enhancing integrity at the levels of the executive branch of government (with special reference to the defense ministry), parliaments, audit offices, ombudsman institutions, the defense sector, civil society, the media, and international organizations. Part IV of the compendium discusses the practicalities of creating and executing integrity-building programs in the military industry. In this context, it is especially critical to recognize the unique culture of the defense organization in a given nation and to reinforce organizational culture elements that support individual and organizational integrity and discourage dishonest behavior. The nation's other public entities can then be informed about these beneficial practices.

Developing, publishing, and implementation of such a document, with a broad participation of public and expert community seems today as one of the only possible potenti-

ally effective measures to combat corruption in defense procurement in Ukraine.

EU defense procurement corruption threats are examined by Czibik et al. [5]. It has long been believed that state capture and corruption pose serious risks to defense acquisition. The authors discovered substantial empirical evidence for this theory by using an objective corruption risk indicator and a sizable dataset of contracts spanning over ten years. The corruption risk index for military contracts is greater than the general contract risk indicator in almost all countries. It was discovered that hazards are strongly grouped when national markets were mapped as complex networks, pointing to possible islands of state capture. Corrupt practices have varying degrees of centralization; in certain countries, the risk of corruption is concentrated in the periphery, but in other countries, it is concentrated in the core of the market. Network maps of procurement markets, according to Czibik et al., are a useful tool for identifying hotspots of corruption risk, particularly in the high-risk setting of defense contracting as a whole. These results, which in national specific are characterized by intricate network relationships, can also be of great use to Ukraine in its fight against corruption in defense procurement. Micro-level studies of important actors are made possible by employing contracting data to measure corruption risk.

Conclusions and prospects for further research

Uncurbed defense corruption lead to arising of considerable challenges to the efficiency of the defense establishment and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. It can damage a military's worldwide reputation, impair public confidence in the armed forces, have a detrimental effect on national security, and, in severe circumstances, even jeopardize the democratic process or the basis of the state itself.

When a country deploys its troops in operations, corruption affects their operational effectiveness dramatically. The role and utility of military formations are restricted by inadequate capabilities. Lower-quality equipment increases the risk to the soldiers and may result in more casualties.

The public's trust in the military and the national armed forces may suffer as a result of even isolated incidents of corruption in the defense establishment, which tarnishes the entire defense apparatus. When they hear about corruption among their leadership, the pride that both military personnel and civilian workers in the defense sector have in their service to the nation is severely damaged. Defense personnel morale and public perception of the military are further damaged by the absence of consequences in well-publicized instances of severe corruption among the highest levels of the government. Consequently, this adversely impacts the military's capacity to draw in competent personnel. Therefore, it is clear that one of the causes of the mobilization potential issues in Ukraine is the country's propensity for corruption scandals involving defense contracting.

Corruption may take many different forms, and when the defense industry is not held to a high enough standard of transparency and accountability to the public and legislatures, it becomes more widespread. Transparency is a great instrument for releasing the defense sector from the vices of corruption in the long run, but it may also expose corrupt operations, which could have negative short-term effects. Although there are numerous instances of corruption in the defense sector, there are also well-established procedures

that, when combined with efforts to improve organizational culture and individual conduct, can help reduce the likelihood of corruption. These procedures include organizational, legislative, and procedural measures. Even though there is not a nation or defense agency that is completely free from corruption, systematic efforts to enhance accountability, transparency, and integrity within the defense sector can reduce the likelihood of corruption while maximizing the effectiveness of the armed forces and their reputation in the community.

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КОРУПЦІЯ В ОБОРОННИХ ЗАКУПІВЛЯХ: КЛЮЧОВІ ЗАГРОЗИ ТА МЕХАНІЗМИ ЇХ ПОДОЛАННЯ ДЛЯ ЗАБЕЗПЕЧЕННЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ УКРАЇНИ

Вступ. Військові закупівлі є критично важливими для національної оборони. Але це супроводжується суперечностями, які існують навіть в усіх демократичних суспільствах. Зазвичай вони виникають через погано узгоджені стимули, створені взаємодією наскрізних інтересів у виконавчій і законодавчій гілках влади, а також в оборонній промисловості. Окрім цього, існують особливі виклики, сформовані особливостями історії та політичної культури кожної країни, і якщо корупція серйозно проникла у "тканину" загального ландшафту країни, боротьба з корупцією в оборонних закупівлях може здатися надзвичайно важкою, тоді як корупція в цій сфері становить критичну загрозу національній безпеці, особливо у воєнний час.

Актуальність дослідження. Сьогодні корупція в українській армії є вже не деформацією суспільного розвитку, а майже нормою для військової організації. Інформація про корупційні прояви у військовій сфері знаходить своє вираження у численних кримінальних справах. Головним результатом корупційних дій є неякісне надання послуг, капітального ремонту та будівництва, постачання продукції товарів, послуг, а головне – озброєнь та військової техніки, яка зрештою позначається на загальному стані військової безпеки та обороноздатності держави. У цьому контексті доцільно розглянути загальні концептуальні положення щодо феномену корупції у військових закупівлях, а також проаналізувати досвід різних країн у цій сфері.

Методи. Дослідження проводили в межах системного підходу на основі загальнонаукових методів пізнання, адекватних завданням дослідження. В роботі використано діалектичний метод наукового пізнання, метод аналізу та синтезу, індукції та дедукції, метод аналогії, порівняльний метод, метод узагальнення даних. У процесі пошуку літературних джерел було заслужено елементи систематичного огляду та обґрунтованої теорії.

Результати. Довіра громадськості до армії та національних збройних сил може постраждати внаслідок навіть поодиноких випадків корупції в оборонному відомстві, що залямає весь оборонний апарат. Моральний дух персоналу оборони та суспільне сприйняття військових ще більше погіршуються через відсутність наслідків у широко розголосених випадках серйозної корупції на найвищих рівнях влади. Отже, це негативно впливає на здатність армії залучати компетентний персонал. Тому зрозуміло, що однією з причин проблем мобілізаційного потенціалу в Україні є схильність країни до корупційних скандалів із оборонним замовленням. Отримані дані дали змогу запропонувати використати певний цінний досвід, такий як розроблення, публікація та впровадження спеціального Компендіуму, подібного до того, який опублікував Женевський центр демократичного контролю над збройними силами (DCAF). Мережні карти ринків закупівель, що є ефективним інструментом для виявлення проблемних точок корупційного ризику, особливо в загальному контексті високого ризику оборонних контрактів, також пропонують для використання в українській системі оборонних закупівель. Незважаючи на те, що немає країни чи оборонного відомства, які були б повністю вільні від корупції, систематичні зусилля щодо підвищення підзвітності, прозорості та доброчесності в оборонному секторі можуть зменшити ймовірність корупції, одночасно максимізуючи ефективність збройних сил і їхню репутацію в громадах і суспільстві загалом.

Ключові слова: оборонні закупівлі; корупція; збройні сили; ризик; мережа; НАТО.